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PRECEDENT OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO
THE CIA'S HIGH VALUE DETAINEES
PROGRAM IN AND THROUGH EUROPE
Tarik Abdel-Monem*
I. INTRODUCTION: "THE SPIDER'S WEB"
Rendering terror suspects to nations that permit the use of
torture is one of several methods the United States has added to
its national security arsenal in recent decades. News leaks and
reports regarding the "outsourcing of terror" are not new, espe-
cially after September 11, 2001. According to a former CIA of-
ficial, "[w]e pick up a suspect or we arrange for one of our
partner countries to do it. Then the suspect is placed on civilian
transport to a third country where, let's make no bones about it,
they use torture. If you want a good interrogation, you send
someone to Jordan."1
Jordan is a United States ally that is - according to other
former officials - "willing to help any way they can" and has
"the most professional and sophisticated interrogators [the
United States] can rely on."2 Reports by Amnesty International
and other news sources have identified Jordan as a transit or
destination point for terror suspects apprehended in Afghani-
stan or Pakistan.3 Allegations of torture associated with the ren-
dition of terror suspects to Jordan should not be surprising. A
U.S. State Department country report on human rights in Jor-
dan that was released on March 6, 2007, referred to a number of
* Research Specialist, University of Nebraska Public Policy Center; J.D. and
M.P.H., University of Iowa.
1. See Adrian Levy & Kathy Scott-Clark, One Huge US Jail, GUARDIAN, Mar.
19, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/O,,5150244-108920,00.html (dis-
cussing United States' international network of detention facilities created in wake of
9111).
2. See Ken Silverstein, U.S. Partnership with Jordan was Targeted, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2005 (interviewing former CIA and State Department officials about rendi-
tion to Jordan).
3. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, JORDAN 'YOUR CONFESSIONS ARE READY TO
SIGN': DETENTION AND TORTURE OF POLITICAL SUSPECTS (2006), available at http://
web.amnesty.orgilibrary/IndexlENGMDEI60052006 (discussing allegations of torture
and mistreatment by Jordanian security forces and rendition); Silverstein, supra note
2 (identifying six cases of alleged rendition involving Jordan).
Abdel-Monem in Suffolk Transnational Law Review (2007) 31(1). 
       Copyright 2007, Suffolk University. Used by permission.
46 SUFFOLK TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1
torture allegations and other basic human rights violations com-
mitted by its government.4
Recent charges that European nations have played a role in
the United States' practice of rendition were much more surpris-
ing. A number of European nations have been sharp critics of
United States' policies regarding the continued detention of in-
mates at Guantanamo Bay, including European nationals.5
Most importantly, Europe arguably has the world's strongest re-
gional human rights treaty in existence: The European Conven-
tion on Human Rights.6
The first major account of alleged "black sites" on Euro-
pean soil was reported in a November 2,2005, Washington Post
story by Dana Priest.7 According to the article, the CIA devel-
oped a global transit and detention system with little strategic
planning or forethought shortly following September 11, 200l.
Terror suspects captured in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or other na-
tions by the U.S. military or intelligence services of partnering
agencies were classified into two different groups. Those with
questionable intelligence value were provided to the govern-
ments of Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco for interrogation. A sec-
ond group of about thirty detainees, considered to be high value
intelligence sources, were imprisoned in secret sites directly fi-
nanced and operated by CIA personnel at Guantanamo Bay, a
location in Thailand,s and undisclosed Eastern European
nations. 9
4. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, JORDAN: COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES (2006), available at http://www.state.gov/g1drl/rls/hrrpt/2006178855.htm
(outlining allegations of various human and civil rights violations in Jordan).
5. The most well known case is that of British nationals nicknamed "the Tipton
Three." One of the three was the named plaintiff in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004). The story of "the Tipton Three" was recently portrayed in the film THE ROAD
TO GUANTANAMO (Roadside Attractions 2006).
6. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention for Human Rights].
7. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons: Debate is Growing
Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up After 9/11,
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al (reporting alleged covert detention system operated
by CIA in nations including Afghanistan, Thailand, and Eastern European countries).
8. See Disbelief at Thai Terror Centre Denial, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov.
5, 2005 available at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2005/11105/1130823430288.html
(noting rumored black site in Thailand was Voice of America radio station in Udon
Thani province).
9. See id. (outlining development and existence of CIA's alleged international
detention system for terror suspects).
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Following the Washington Post's article, further revelations
were reported about the extent of the CIA system by a variety
of sources. On November 7, 2005, Human Rights Watch issued
a press release stating that their independent research con-
firmed the Post's report. IO According to its accounts, examina-
tion of flight records of a CIA operated airplane indicated that
in 2003 and 2004, it had transported a number of detainees be-
tween Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, Morocco, Romania, and
Poland. ll The same day the Council of Europe appointed Dick
Marty, a Swiss member of the Parliamentary Assembly, to lead
an investigation into the alleged prisons in the Council's mem-
ber-statesP Soon afterwards, Marty requested information on
air traffic patterns from EuroControl, Europe's unified air traf-
fic management organization, and the European Union's Satel-
lite Centre.!3
The Council of Europe's Secretary General, Terry Davis,
also sent a formal questionnaire to every member-state of the
Council on November 21, 2005, requesting information on how
the member-states' national laws prevented cooperation with
foreign intelligence services to secretly detain individuals.!4 In
December, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a state-
ment intimating that any actions taken by the United States in
Europe were conducted with regard to the full sovereignty of
host nations, and that she could not "discuss information that
would compromise the success of intelligence, law enforcement
10. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Statement on
U.S. Secret Detention Facilities in Europe (Nov. 7, 2005), available at http://hrw.orgl
english/docs/2005/11107/usint1l995.htm (outlining research based on flight records of
a CIA operated plane).
11. Id. (detailing plane flight records carrying detainees to various countries).
12. Letter from Holly Cartner, Dir. Of Eur. And Cent. Asia Div., and Lotte
Leicht, European Union Dir., to Ministers of member States of the Council of Europe
(Jan. 9, 2006), http://hrw.orglenglish/docs/2006/01l06/euI2385.htm (noting appoint-
ment of Dick Marty to lead investigation into alleged prison sites).
13. See Europe 'Knew About' CIA Flights, BBC, Jan. 24, 2006, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4641810.stm (discussing Mr. Marty's investigation).
14. See Cartner, supra note 12; MIS 'Given Secret Prisons Data', BBC, Nov. 24,
2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4464962.stm (quoting
Mr. Terry's request to obtain information about "the manner in which their internal
law ensures that acts by officials of foreign agencies within their jurisdiction are sub-
ject to adequate controls").
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and military operations."15 The statement was interpreted as an
implied admission that the clandestine prisons did exist in Eu-
rope, and that such operations were conducted with the permis-
sion of European authorities.16
While European investigations intensified, accounts of "er-
roneous renditions" were also made public. In another article
written by Dana Priest in December of 2005, the Washington
Post reported that the U.S. Ambassador to Germany told the
German interior minister that the CIA had mistakenly detained
a German national for five monthsY Khaled Masri, the wrong-
fully detained German citizen, was arrested by local police while
vacationing in Macedonia. The authorities turned Masri over to
CIA operatives, who took him to Afghanistan, where the CIA
held and allegedly tortured him. One of Masri's interrogators
reportedly said, "[y]ou are here in a country where no one
knows about you, in a country where there is no law. If you die,
we will bury you, and no one will know."18 Masri was later
flown back to Europe and left on a remote Albanian hillside in
the middle of the night without explanation. The authorities ar-
rested Masri because he shared a name with a wanted 9/ll-asso-
ciated suspect. Priest's article further described an alleged
account of how the CIA "rendition group" operates:
Members of the Rendition Group follow a simple but standard proce-
dure: Dressed head to toe in black, including masks, they blindfold
and cut the clothes off their new captives, then administer an enema
and sleeping drugs. They outfit detainees in a diaper and jumpsuit for
what can be a day-long trip. Their destinations: either a detention
facility operated by cooperative countries in the Middle East and
Central Asia, including Afghanistan, or one of the CIA's own covert
prisons - referred to in classified documents as "black sites," which
at various times have been operated in eight countries, including sev-
eral in Eastern Europe.19
Similar stories were also reported in the European press.
An Egyptian cleric living in Italy was allegedly kidnapped by
15. See Glenn Kessler, Rice Defends Tactics Used Against Suspects, WASH. POST,
Dec. 6, 2005, at A1 (discussing Condoleezza Rice's statements about alleged prison
system made prior to European visit).
16. See id. (explaining Rice's comments acknowledged United States knew about
rendition).
17. Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH.
POST, Dec. 4, 2005, at AI.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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CIA operatives in 2003, flown to Egypt, tortured, and later re-
leased. Italian prosecutors have since issued warrants for the
suspected CIA agents, who no longer reside in Italy.20 Follow-
ing the July 7, 2005, London train bombings, a number of Pakis-
tani migrant workers in Greece were allegedly detained,
interrogated, and mistreated by a combination of Greek and
British intelligence operatives. The Pakistani workers were later
released, and the governments of Greece, the United Kingdom,
and Pakistan denied any involvement, despite protests from
Greek opposition parliamentarians.21 Both the Italian and
Greek situations continue to be investigated.
On September 26, 2002, a Canadian citizen suspected of be-
ing an al-Qaida associate - Maher Arar - was arrested at JFK
Airport while in transit from North Africa to Montreal. Arar
was sent to Syria, where he was allegedly detained in a "grave-
like" cell, beaten with fists and cords, and deprived of food and
water.22 After a diplomatic row between Canada, Syria, and the
United States, he was released over a year later and reunited
with his family. Arar's ordeal and subsequent media attention
led to Time magazine naming him the "Canadian Newsmaker of
the Year" in 2004.23
In the January 2006 interim report on the Council of Eu-
rope's formal investigation into the detention centers, Dick
Marty referenced an intercepted fax by Egyptian authorities
that "black sites" had existed in Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia,
20. See Italy Issues Fresh CIA Warrants, BBC, July 25, 2005, http://
news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/europe/4716333.stm (discussing the case of Osama Mustafa
Hassan).
21. See Greek MPs Press 'Abductions' Case, BBC, Dec. 27, 2005, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4563168.stm (discussing calls for investigating alleged ab-
ductions by Greek opposition parliamentarians); Ruling backs Greek abduction case,
BBC, May 11, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4763777.stm (discussing Greek
prosecutor's recommendation that charges be pressed against Greek security person-
nel allegedly involved in abductions).
22. See DeNeen L. Brown & Dana Priest, Deported Terror Suspect Details Tor-
ture in Syria, WASH. POST, Nov. 5,2003, at Al (discussing case of Arar); Tim Harper,
U.S. ruling dismisses Arar lawsuit, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 17, 2006, at A2.
23. See Arar Named 2004 Canadian Newsmaker, CBC NEWS, Dec. 20, 2004,
http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/nationaI/2004/12/19/time-newsmaker041219.html;
Steven Frank, Seeking The Truth; Why Was Maher Arar Detained and Handed to Syr-
ian Torturers? His Search For Answers Is Shaking Canada's Establishment, TIME
INT'L, Dec. 27, 2004, at 70.
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Kosovo and Ukraine.24 Marty also stated that, if practices of
rendition by CIA operatives occurred in Europe, it was "highly
unlikely that European governments, or at least their intelli-
gence services, were unaware [of them]."25
Following an examination of information gathered from
Council of Europe member-states, Secretary General Davis re-
leased a statement concluding that almost none of the member-
states had adequate measures in place to prevent foreign intelli-
gence operatives from violating human rights on Council of Eu-
rope member-states' soi1.26 Davis had previously noted that
"Europe appears to be a happy hunting ground for foreign se-
curity services."27 He also stated that "[w]e have received offi-
cial acknowledgment of 'handing over' individuals to foreign
officials through procedures which ignore the standards and
safeguards required by the European Convention on Human
Rights. "28
In a comprehensive report on the alleged detention system,
issued on June 7, 2006, Marty described the CIA operation as "a
network that resembles a 'spider's web' spun across the
globe."29 According to information gathered from member-
state governments, witness accounts, satellite imagery, and air
traffic records, Marty's report described hundreds of flights
through European air space, abductions, and end-point destina-
24. See Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged Secret Detentions In Council of Europe Member
States, <jj5, AS/Jur (2006) 03 rev, (Jan. 22, 2006) (prepared by Dick Marty) available at
http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2006/20060124_JdocO32006_E.pdf (referenc-
ing fax from Egyptian authorities to Egyptian embassy in London intercepted by
Swiss intelligence services).
25. See id. <jj 66.
26. Speaking Notes of Terry Davis, Secretary General of the Council of Europe,
Strasbourg Press Conference, (Apr. 12, 2006), http://www.coe.int/t/secretarygeneraU
sg/speeches/2006/J_12042006_Speaking%20notes%20Press%20conference_en.asp.
27. Press Release, Council of Europe Secretary General, Publication of the Re-




28. Davis, supra note 26.
29. EUR. PARL. Ass., Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Trans-
fers Involving Council of Europe Member States, <jj 280, AS/Jur (2006) 16 Part II,
(June. 7, 2006), (prepared by Dick Marty) http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/
committeedocs/2006/20060606_ejdoc162006partii-final.htm.
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tions across the world where terror suspects were ultimately
detained.
The report identified four categories of locations composing
the rendition network: (1) "Stopover points" in Athens, Greece;
Prague, Czech Republic; Prestwick, Scotland; and Roma
Ciampino, Italy where civilian and military aircraft stopped for
refueling; (2) "Staging points," in Baku, Azerbaijian; Frankfurt
and Ramstein, Germany; and Larnaca, Cyprus where operations
were planned; (3) "Pick-up points" in Aviano, Italy; Skopje,
Macedonia; Stockholm, Sweden; and Tuzla, Bosnia where indi-
viduals were arrested and flown to other nations; and (4)
"Transfer/Drop-off points" in Amman, Jordan; Baghdad, Iraq;
Cairo, Egypt; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Kabul, Afghanistan;
Szymany, Poland; Tashkent, Uzbekistan; and Timisoara,
Romania where detainees were transported.3D By implication,
Marty's report named a number of European nations responsi-
ble for "active or passive collusion" in the rendition network:
Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.31 Finally,
the report identified seven nations associated with specific cases
of alleged rendition: Bosnia; Germany; Italy; the former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia; Sweden; Turkey; and the United
Kingdom.32 The report concluded that Europe was "not a vic-
tim of a secret CIA plot," because a number of European na-
tions either actively participated with the CIA in the
development and maintenance of the rendition network, or
knowingly allowed the network to operate while doing
nothing.33
President George Bush officially disclosed the existence of
the CIA detention system during a speech given in the East
Room on September 6, 2006.34 In his speech, the President
stated that "a small number of suspected terrorist leaders and
operatives" had been detained and questioned outside the coun-
try, including Abu Zubaydeh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.35
30. See id. at 16, 17.
31. See id. at 60.
32. See id. at 60.
33. See id. at 59.
34. George W. Bush, President, Speech in East Room Discussing Creation of
Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html.
35.Id.
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He also stated that "[t]he United States does not torture. It's
against our laws, and it's against our values. I have not author-
ized it - and I will not authorize it."36 There was no mention,
however, whether other nations tortured suspects after they
were rendered through the CIA program.
II. ANALYSIS: ApPLICATION OF ECHR PRECEDENT
A. The European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights is arguably
the Council of Europe's most important creation and raison
d'etre of the regional organization. The Council was created in
1949 to protect democracy and human rights in post-war Eu-
ropeY Due to the nature of the political charter, initial mem-
bership in the Council was restricted to ten allied Western
European countries and excluded non-democratic Soviet-bloc
nations.38 The Council has subsequently expanded to include
forty-six European nations, including Turkey, Russia, and al-
most every ex-Soviet bloc nation in Eastern Europe.39 Every
one of the European nations mentioned in the Marty report are
also Council of Europe members.
The Council created the European Convention on Human
Rights in 1950.40 As a requirement of membership in the Coun-
cil, all member-states must become party to the Convention and
36.Id.
37. See Lamberto Dini, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Address at the Eu-
ropean Ministerial Conference on Human Rights (Nov. 3, 2000), in COUNCIL OF Eu-
ROPE, EUROPEAN MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS &
COMMEMORATIVE CEREMONY OF THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE EUROPEAN CON-
VENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 15 (2002). "The Council of Europe has changed into a
more political and operational organization. One thing has not changed: the protec-
tion of human rights is and remains at the heart of its mission." See id. at 15. (state-
ment of Walter Schwimmer, Secretary General of the Council of Europe).
38. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MANUAL OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE: STRUC-
TURE, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 3 (1970) (listing original ten members of
Council: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).
39. See Council of Europe, The Council of Europe's Member States, http://
www.coe.intlT/E/Com/AbouCCoe/Member_states/default.asp (last visited Jan. 1,
2008) (providing comprehensive list of Council of Europe members and their respec-
tive joining dates).
40. See DONNA GOMIEN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CON-
VENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 17-19 (1996)
(discussing creation and early history of European Convention on Human Rights).
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adhere to its requirements and obligations.41 Many of the Euro-
pean Convention's protections reflect those also provided in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which served as a
model for the Convention and its drafters.42 Human rights se-
cured under the Convention include the right to life,43 right to
liberty and security,44 right to a fair trial,45 prohibition of torture
or degrading treatment or punishment,46 and right to prohibi-
tion of slavery and forced labor.47
The Convention's judicial body is the European Court of
Human Rights (Court of Human Rights), based in Strasbourg,
France. Bringing a case to the Court under alleged Convention
violations is still an avenue of last resort. Under the Convention,
the Strasbourg Court can only hear controversies after all do-
mestic options for relief have been exhausted.48 Similarly, it will
not review cases that have been brought before another interna-
tional tribuna1.49 Cases are routinely declared inadmissible be-
cause of failure to meet such standards.
Still, the Court maintains final jurisdiction over all Council
of Europe member-states.50 Additionally, not only member-
states, but individuals can bring cases for review before the
41. See European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 6, ("The High Con-
tracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and free-
doms defined in Section I of this Convention.").
42. See European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 6 ("Considering the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on 10th December 1948 ... as the governments of European coun-
tries ... take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights
stated in the Universal Declaration").
43. European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 6, at art. 2.
44. European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 6, at art. 5.
45. European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 6, at art. 6.
46. European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 6, at art. 3.
47. European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 6, at art. 4.
48. See European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 6, at art. 35(1)
("The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been
exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within
a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.").
49. European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 6, at art. 35(2).
50. See European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 6, at art. 32(1)
("The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpreta-
tion and application of the Convention."); European Convention for Human Rights,
supra note 6, at art. 32(2) ("In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has juris-
diction, the Court shall decide."); European Convention for Human Rights, supra
note 6, at art. 46(1) ("The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.").
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Court.51 Virtually all rulings by the Court are respected by
member-states.52 This includes judgments requiring the pay-
ment of significant monetary damages to plaintiffs.53 Member-
states have also made considerable changes to domestic laws in
order to comply with the Court's judgments.54 For these rea-
sons, the Convention is arguably one of the strongest regionally
enforced human rights treaties in the world, and the number of
cases brought before the Court of Human Rights has increased,
particularly with the admission of new member-states in the
Council such as Russia.55
B. Application of Convention Obligations to the CIA
Detention System in Europe
In the context of prison conditions and alleged human
rights violations, a number of important cases have been de-
cided on the basis of Article 3 of the Convention, which prohib-
its torture and inhuman treatment.56 Ireland v. United
Kingdom5? was one of the first notable cases dealing with allega-
tions of inhuman treatment of prisoners in custody. In Ireland,
alleged operatives of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were ar-
51. European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 6, at art. 34 ("The
Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Con-
tracting Parties.").
52. See D.J. HARRIS ET. AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 702 ("[L]evel of compliance with judgments ... is generally recognised to be
exemplary.").
53. See European Human Rights Court Condemns Turkey in Kurd's Death,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 14, 2002 (noting $59,600 fine imposed on Turkey for
torture-death of Kurd); Council of Europe Says London Must Allow Elections in Gi-
braltar, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jun. 26, 2001 (noting $64,000 fine imposed on
United Kingdom for not securing voting rights for residents of Gibraltar); France
Fined by European Court Over Murder Trial of German, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Feb. 13, 2001 (noting $14,000 fine imposed on France for failing to secure trial rights
for German doctor).
54. See MANUAL OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE: STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS 282 (1970) (noting instances when Norway changed its constitution
and Austria changed its Code of Criminal Procedure).
55. See Strasbourg Court Sets Undesirable Precedent for Russia, RIA NOVOSTl,
Mar. 3, 2005 ("The European Court for Human Rights has already received more
than 150 'Chechen cases,' i.e. complaints from Russian citizens who suffered in mili-
tary operations during the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya.").
56. See European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 6, at art. 3 ("No one
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
57. 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1978).
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rested and imprisoned by British forces following a wide-scale
anti-IRA campaign initiated in 1971.58 Military forces interro-
gated a number of individuals at length, utilizing practices de-
signed to physically and psychologically impair and disorient
detainees, such as hooding, prolonged standing, sleep depriva-
tion, exposure to loud noise, and food and water deprivation.59
In its analysis, the Court of Human Rights stated that a determi-
nation of whether such activities were deemed to be either "in-
human treatment" or "torture" - both of which were prohibited
by Article 3 - was a question of fact. 60 The Court concluded
that all of the interrogation techniques were severe enough that
they amounted to inhuman treatment, and were thus illegal
under the Convention.61
The 1999 case Selmouni v. France62 is also a noteworthy de-
velopment in the Court's Article 3 case law. In Selmouni, a
Dutch-Moroccan drug dealer was arrested by French police and
seriously beaten while in custody.63 Besides being repeatedly
struck with a bat, he was also sodomized with a baton, urinated
on, and threatened with syringes and a blowtorch - allegations
that corresponded with medical examinations conducted after
his eventual release.64 As in Ireland, the Court stated that a fac-
tual analysis was necessary to determine if such acts amounted
to a violation of Article 3, and concluded that the conduct of the
French police was so egregious that their actions did in fact
amount to torture.65 In an interesting dictum, the Court noted
that" [e]ven in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight
against terrorism and organized crime, the Convention prohibits
in absolute terms torture. "66 This principle reflects the Conven-
tion's requirement that the prohibition on torture is one of the
58. [d. 91 39 (outlining operations conducted under Operation Demetrius).
59. [d. n 92-93,96 (describing allegations of mistreatment by prison personnel
and interrogators).
60. See id. 91 162 (noting facts necessary to determine if activities rise to level of
severity considered inhuman treatment).
61. See id. 9191 164-68 (holding practices of abuse in detention facilities contrary
to Article 3).
62. 1999 Eur. Ct. H.R. 66 (1999).
63. [d. 91 19.
64. See id. 91 24 (describing Selmouni's allegations of abuse and corresponding
medical evidence).
65. See id. n 105-06 (finding France in violation of Article 3 prohibition of
torture).
66. Selmouni v. France, 1999 Eur. Ct. H.R. 66 91 95.
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Convention's "non-derogable" obligations, as even in circum-
stances of emergency, Article 3 protections cannot be subverted
or waived. 67 Through Selmouni, France earned the dubious dis-
tinction of being the first Western European nation found in vio-
lation of the Convention's ban on torture.
Ireland and Selmouni have set important precedent outlin-
ing what forms of treatment violate the Article 3 prohibition of
torture and inhuman treatment. Additionally, allegations about
the secret prisons on European soil raise significant implications
for Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1 strictly mandates that
its member-states uphold the Convention's protections on its
soil: "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ...
this Convention. "68 The Convention thus imposes a positive ob-
ligation on member-states to safeguard human rights protections
of persons within its physical territory. Regardless of whether
or not European officials knew about, or were involved in, the
administration of CIA prisons in Europe, a strict reading of Ar-
ticle 1 dictates that European nations should be held responsible
for the commission of any human rights violations in Europe by
the CIA or any other organization.
This principle is illustrated in Ila~ cu v. Moldova and Rus-
sia,69 which was decided in 2004. The critical factual context in
the case centered around Moldova's civil war and subsequent
break-up into two different territories. Following the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union, the former Moldavian Soviet Socialist
Republic declared its independence in 1991 and changed its
name to the Republic of Moldova.70 In 1992, the newly inde-
pendent Moldova was admitted into the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations.71 At the
same time, the eastern portion of the former Soviet Republic
declared its own independence as the Moldovan Republic of
Transdniestria (MRT).72 Ethnic differences between the major-
67. See European Convention for Human Rights, art. 15(2) ("No derogation
from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from
Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.").
68. European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 6, at art. 1.
69. I1a~cu v. Moldova (merits), 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46 (2004).
70. See id. 'll'll 28-39 (outlining historical background of the independence move-
ment of the Republic of Moldova).
71. Id. 'll 40 (noting Moldova's entrance into CSCE and United Nations).
72. See id. 'll 30.
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ity Romanian population of the republic and Slavic ethnicities in
the east fueled the bifurcation of the republic into these two sep-
arate territories.73 Armed conflict between Moldovan forces
and Transdniestrian separatists who wanted to remain with Rus-
sia began in 1990.74 Shortly thereafter, the former Soviet Four-
teenth Army, which had been based in Moldova since it was a
Soviet Republic, entered the conflict and provided active mili-
tary support to the pro-Russian separatists.75 The government
of Russia also established close diplomatic and economic rela-
tions with the breakaway republic.76 With Russian economic
and military assistance, the MRT was able to repel Moldovan
forces and maintain itself as a separate territory.77
The plaintiffs in the case were Ilie Ila§ cu, Andrei Ivantoc,
Alexandru Le§co, and Tudor Petrov-Popa, four Moldovan na-
tionalists who were detained by the separatist forces and alleg-
edly beaten and mistreated as the civil war erupted.78 Their
captors were a mix of soldiers from the Fourteenth Army and
MRT forces, and they were held in the Fourteenth Army head-
quarters in the breakaway Transdniestrian republic.79 While de-
tained, the plaintiffs were allegedly beaten, attacked with dogs,
subjected to hallucinogenic drugs, and deprived of standard le-
gal rights.80 An MRT court tried the Moldovan nationalists on a
series of charges under the criminal code of the former
Moldovan Soviet Republic, and found them guilty of a number
73. See generally Nicholas Dima, Politics and Religion in Moldova: A Case Study,
34 MANKIND Q. 175 (1994) (discussing ethnic tensions in Moldova and its relation to
country's civil war).
74. See Ila§cu, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, 'll 43-44 (noting early development of armed
hostilities between Moldovan and separatist forces).
75. See id. 'll'll 42-69 (outlining involvement of Fourteenth Army in separatist
cause).
76. See id. 'll'll 137-58.
77. See generally Charles King, Eurasia Letter: Moldova with a Russian Face,
FOREIGN POL'y, Winter 1994, at 106 (discussing Moscow's relationship with Transdni-
estria). See also Pal Kolsto, Andrei Edemsky & Natalya Kalashnikova, The Dniester
Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism, 45 EUROPE-AsIA STUDIES 973, 973-
1000 (1993).
78. See Ilascu, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, 'll'll 188-211 (outlining plaintiffs' allegations
and circumstances surrounding detention).
79. See id. 'll'll 196-211 (discussing alleged conditions of plaintiffs' temporary de-
tention in Fourteenth Army garrison).
80. Id. 'll'll 201-11 (discussing alleged conditions while detained by MRT police
forces).
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of offenses.81 The plaintiffs later sued both the Republic of
Moldova and Russia on a variety of charges under the European
Convention, alleging violations of the Article 3 prohibition of
inhuman treatment and torture, the Article 5 right to liberty,
and the Article 6 right to a fair tria1.82
The principal question facing the Strasbourg Court involved
the Article 1 obligation for member-states of the Convention to
protect human rights within their jurisdiction. In this case, how-
ever, the alleged violations occurred in the territory of a break-
away republic where the separatist MRT government and
Russia maintained de facto control.
Russia argued that it should not be responsible for the ac-
tivities conducted within the MRT because it was not Russian
territory and that the presence of their troops in the breakaway
region was for "peacekeeping" reasons.83 The four plaintiffs,
however, argued that Russia should be responsible for human
rights violations within the MRT. They asserted that the Rus-
sian Fourteenth Army played a direct role in fighting with and
supporting the separatist forces in the military conflict, which
repelled Moldovan national forces and secured the territory of
the MRT.84 They also asserted that Russia had done nothing to
prevent Cossack mercenaries from entering the MRT to fight
alongside the separatists, and had in fact encouraged them to do
SO.85 The provision of economic and political support by Russia
on a number of levels also helped the MRT regime exist.86 In
sum, the plaintiffs argued that Russia's support for the separat-
ists in the Moldovan civil war resulted in the creation of the
MRT, which was a de facto Russian occupation.87
In its Grand Chamber decision by seventeen Strasbourg
judges, the Court of Human Rights sided with the plaintiffs,
81. ld. <j[<j[ 215-19 (describing trials and verdicts of plaintiffs in MRT court).
82. ld. <j[ 3 (outlining the plaintiffs' charges).
83. See Ila~cu, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, <j[<j[ 353-54 (outlining Russia's defense to
charges it was responsible for alleged actions under Article 1).
84. See id. n 364-65 (asserting Russia had directly engaged Moldovan forces in
civil war).
85. ld. <j[ 366 (outlining plaintiffs' arguments regarding Russia's complicity with
Cossacks and other mercenaries fighting with MRT).
86. See id. <j[ 369 (discussing plaintiffs' arguments regarding economic activities
between MRT and Russian entities).
87. ld. <j[ 364.
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pointing to a long list of observations about Russia's military,
political, and economic support for the MRT:
All of the above proves that the "MRT", set up in 1991-92 with the
support of the Russian Federation, vested with organs of power and
its own administration, remains under the effective authority, or at
the very least under the decisive influence, of the Russian Federation,
and in any event that it survives by virtue of the military, economic,
financial and political support given it by the Russian Federation.
That being so, the Court considers that there is a continuous and
uninterrupted link of responsibility on the part of the Russian Federa-
tion for the applicants' fate.
In conclusion, the applicants therefore come within the "jurisdic-
tion" of the Russian Federation for the purposes of [Article] 1 of the
Convention.88
The evidence indicated that the four plaintiffs suffered from va-
rious forms of mistreatment while held in the custody of the
MRT, and because of Russian jurisdiction in that area, the
Court held that Russia was in violation of Article 3 of the Con-
vention prohibiting torture and inhuman treatment.89
The more difficult question before the Court was whether
or not the Moldovan government was responsible for the al-
leged human rights violations of the four plaintiffs under Article
1. Moldova argued that it could not be responsible for any ac-
tivities conducted within the breakaway MRT because it had no
control or authority in that area, even though the alleged viola-
tions occurred within the physical borders of the nation.90 The
plaintiffs contended that although the alleged mistreatment was
committed by separatists in an area controlled by them, the gov-
ernment of Moldova should still bear responsibility because it
had positive obligations under the Convention to take sufficient
measures to safeguard human rights within the physical borders
of Moldova.91
In its assessment, the Court recognized that the literal
meaning of "jurisdiction" in the Convention's Article 1 phrase
to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
88. Ila~cu, 40 Em. Ct. H.R. 46, <j[ 392-94.
89. See id. <j[<j[ 434-54 (discussing cases of Mr. Ila§cu, Mr. Ivantoc, Mr. Le§co, and
Mr. Petrov-Popa).
90. See id. <j[ 300 (outlining Moldova's argument that it lacked territorial jurisdic-
tion and authority in MRT).
91. See id. <j[ 306 (outlining plaintiffs' arguments regarding Moldova's
responsibilities).
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freedoms" is the physical area within the borders of member-
states.92 However, there are limited exceptions to this defini-
tion. A state's "jurisdiction" under Article 1 may extend be-
yond its physical borders in certain situations where its actions
have a proximate effect on events that occur in other nations.93
Additionally, a state's jurisdiction may not extend to its borders
in the event of a military occupation by an invading nation, such
as the situation in Turkish-controlled CypruS.94 Determining if
such an exception exists is a question of fact. 95 However, even
when a state does not have complete authority over its own ter-
ritory, it "has a duty to take all the appropriate measures which
it is still within its power to take. "96 In such an examination, the
Court cannot define what activities constitute such a positive ob-
ligation, but it can define the minimum effort that should be un-
dertaken to safeguard the Convention's rights and protections.97
In the case of Moldova, the Court recognized that the na-
tional government was "confronted with a secessionist move-
ment" and that a full-scale civil war had erupted.98 The Court
also recognized that Moldova repeatedly petitioned the interna-
tional community and United Nations regarding the situation,99
and in the face of a secessionist movement backed with Russian
military and economic support, Moldova could do little to
regain control over the breakaway region. lOo After major mili-
92. See id. <j{ 312 (discussing previous case law's definition of "jurisdiction").
93. See Ila~cu, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, n 314-17 (discussing extension of Article 1
jurisdiction); see also Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 439, <j{ 86 (1989).
94. See Ila~cu, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, <j{ 312 (declaring exceptions to member-state's
jurisdiction under the Convention). But cf Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 20
Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 99 (1996); Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, 11 BHRC 45
(2001). In both Loizidou and Cyprus, the Court found Turkey liable for violations of
the Convention in Cyprus because its jurisdiction extended to areas of Cyprus by
virtue of its control through military occupation. See generally Tarik Abdel-Monem,
How Far Do the Lawless Areas of Europe Extend? Extraterritorial Application of the
European Convention on Human Rights, 14 J TRANS. L. & PoL'Y 159, 180-82 (2005)
(discussing jurisdiction of countries in areas controlled by other nations).
95. See Ila~cu, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, <j{ 313 (discussing need to examine objective
facts that limit effective exercise of authority).
96. Id.
97. See id. <j{ 334 (discussing the Court's role in determining what obligations
exist for states in situations of impaired jurisdiction).
98. Id. <j{ 325 (discussing events leading to Civil War in Moldova in early 1990s).
99. Id.
100. See Ila~cu, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, <j{ 341 "In the Court's opinion, when con-
fronted with a regime sustained militarily, politically and economically by a power
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tary hostilities ended in 1992, Moldova entered into a series of
negotiations with the MRT, while continuing its attempts to se-
cure the release of the plaintiffs.101
In May of 2001, following years of pressure from the
Moldovan government, the MRT finally released Ila§cu, one of
the four plaintiffs, from imprisonment.102 Following Ila§cu's re-
lease, however, the Court noted that Moldova's attempts to ne-
gotiate the release of the remaining three plaintiffs slackened,
with little to suggest the government was "diligent" in securing
their freedom. 103 This decrease in actively pressing for the re-
lease of the other three prisoners led the Court to conclude that
Moldova failed to discharge its positive obligation to secure the
prisoners' human rights.l°4 As a result of this analysis, the Court
deemed Russia responsible for violating Article 3's prohibition
of torture and inhuman treatment in regards to Ila§cu's impris-
onment. lOS For the remaining three plaintiffs, however, the
Court held Russia liable for their treatment under Article 3, and
Moldova liable for failing to take the necessary measures to se-
cure their well-being after May of 2001.106 Additionally, the
Court found that both parties violated the Convention's Article
5, which states, "[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security
of person. "107 Russia violated the article by depriving the liberty
of all the plaintiffs through its detention and imprisonment.
Similar to its logic in deciding the Article 3 charges, the Court
found Moldova in violation of Article 5 for Ila§cu until his re-
lease in May of 2001, and for the remaining three plaintiffs for
failing to safeguard their liberty during imprisonmenLl08
such as the Russian Federation ... there was little Moldova could do to re-establish its
authority over Transniesterian territory." [d.
101. See Ila~cu, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, n 345-48 (outlining Moldova's actions re-
garding continued detention of plaintiffs).
102. See id. 'lI 234.
103. See id. 'lI 348 (discussing lack of evidence demonstrating Moldova's commit-
ment to pursue release of prisoners).
104. See id. 'lI 352 (stating Moldova could be held responsible for Convention
violations occurring after May 2001).
105. See Ila~cu, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, 'lI 2 (holding Russia responsible for violating
Article 3 regarding treatment of Ilascu).
106. See id. n 442, 454 (holding Russia and Moldova responsible for Article 3
violations against remaining three plaintiffs).
107. European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 5; see IlasCll, 40
Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, n 455, 463-64 (holding Russia liable for violating Article 5).
108. Ila~cu, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, 'lI'lI 463-64.
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Holding Moldova responsible for Convention violations
that occurred within the breakaway MRT seemed like an unjust
resolution to some. Six of the seventeen judges deciding the Ila~
cu case partly dissented from the remaining Grand Chamber
judges and argued that Moldova should not be liable for the al-
leged violations.I°9 However, the majority's conclusion makes
sense from a normative standpoint because it imposes a strict
burden on member-states to do everything within their power,
and in a reasonable context consistent with law, to secure the
Convention's rights and protections within its jurisdiction.
The Ila~cu ruling has significant relevance to the allegations
over the CIA prisons in Europe. Ila~cu indicates that member-
states of the Convention have a positive obligation to protect
and secure human rights within their physical territory even if
the violations committed are not imputable to a member-state,
are committed by parties not associated with the host govern-
ment, and committed in areas not under the control or authority
of the host government.110 Both Poland and Romania - which
have been identified as host nations of alleged CIA prisons - are
also member-states of the Convention. Because their jurisdic-
tion would be triggered under Article 1, these nations would
thus bear responsibility for any alleged Convention violations
committed by the CIA on their soil. Likely violations would in-
clude inhuman treatment or torture banned by Article 3 if they
occurred at the prisons.
A 2005 report by ABC News indicated that "enhanced in-
terrogation techniques" used by the CIA in overseas operations
included:
1. The Attention Grab: The interrogator forcefully grabs
the shirt front of the prisoner and shakes him.
2. Attention Slap: An open-handed slap aimed at causing
pain and triggering fear.
3. The Belly Slap: A hard open-handed slap to the stomach.
The aim is to cause pain, but not internal injury. Doctors con-
109. See id. (Bratza, N. Rozakis, Hedigan, Thomassen, Pantfru, partly dissenting)
(stating Moldova did not have direct authority over MRT); see id. (Loucaides, dissent-
ing in part) (discussing Moldova's lack of authority over MRT).
110. See Ila~cu, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, <j(Cj[ 349-52, 464 (holding Moldova responsi-
ble for violations occurring in MRT); European Convention for Human Rights, supra
note 6, at art. 56 (extending member-states' jurisdictions to territories within their
responsibility).
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sulted advised against using a punch, which could cause lasting
internal damage.
4. Long Time Standing: This technique is described as
among the most effective. Prisoners are forced to stand, hand-
cuffed and with their feet shackled to an eye bolt in the floor for
more than forty hours. Exhaustion and sleep deprivation are ef-
fective in yielding confessions.
5. The Cold Cell: The prisoner is left to stand naked in a cell
kept near fifty degrees Fahrenheit. Throughout the time in the
cell the prisoner is doused with cold water.
6. Water Boarding: The prisoner is bound to an inclined
board, feet raised and head slightly below the feet. Cellophane
is wrapped over the prisoner's face and water is poured over
him. Unavoidably, the gag reflex kicks in and a terrifying fear
of drowning leads to almost instant pleas to bring the treatment
to a halt.111
The same report indicated that the CIA used these tech-
niques on about a dozen high-value al-Qaida detainees, includ-
ing Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who was held, along with others,
in military installations in Eastern Europe,112 Mohammed re-
portedly "won the admiration" of interrogators for withstanding
water boarding for over two minutes before breaking down, a
length of time that far surpassed the average length of fourteen
seconds most detainees could bear. l13
Little is publicly known about the extent to which the
aforementioned interrogation techniques or other harsh mea-
sures have been used by the CIA or other U.S. personnel on
detainees overseas. In late 2002, the Washington Post reported
that common interrogation techniques used by the CIA in over-
seas operations include: wearing of black hoods, sleep depriva-
tion, exposure to loud noises, and placement in prolonged stress
positions. The Court found in Ireland v. The United Kingdom
that these techniques amounted to inhuman treatment. There
have been reports of deaths allegedly caused by interrogation
111. Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA's Harsh Interrogation Techniques De-
scribed, ABC NEWS, Nov. 18,2005 (discussing case of Khalid Sheik Mohammed and
others), http://abcnews.go.comlWNT/lnvestigation/story?id=1322866&page=l.
112. See id. "Currently, it is believed that one or more former Soviet bloc air
bases and military installations are the Eastern European location of the top suspects.
Khalid Sheik Mohammed is among the suspects detained there, sources said." Id.
113. Id.
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techniques used by U.S. forces. An Iraqi-insurgent was killed at
Abu Ghraib while in the custody of a CIA interrogator after
having been subjected to a "Palestinian hanging" - a technique
allegedly used in Israeli interrogation of Palestinians, where an
individual is hung for a prolonged period from his or her wrists
while bound behind the back,!14 The European Court of
Human Rights found in Aksoy v. Turkey,115 where security
forces hung and brutally beat an alleged member of the Kurdish
separatist movement, that Palestinian hangings are a form of
torture. 116 The CIA killed another Iraqi insurgent in their cus-
tody by wrapping him in a sleeping bag, tying an electrical cord
around him, and beating him to death,!l?
In 2004, the Washington Post reported that the CIA
stopped using such interrogation techniques,!18 Later reports al-
leged, however, that the United States Department of Justice
issued a secret opinion authorizing or re-authorizing the use of
techniques such as water boarding and other harsh physical and
psychological measures on detainees,119 A report by Dick
Marty issued in June of 2007 concluded that the CIA did run
prison facilities in Poland and Romania from 2003 to 2005.120
These operations were created through a combination of NATO
multilateral agreements and bilateral arrangements between the
114. See Jane Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation: Can the CIA Legally Kill a Pris-
oner? NEW YORKER, Nov. 14,2005, at 44.
115. App. No. 21987/93, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 553, 'll 64 (1996).
116. See id. (finding "Palestinian Hanging" cruel treatment characteristic of
torture).
117. See Josh White, Documents Tell ofBrutal Improvisation by GIs; Interrogated
General's Sleeping-Bag Death, CIA's Use of Secret Iraqi Squad Are Among Details,
WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2005, at Al (describing death of Abed Hamed Mowhoush).
118. See Dana Priest, CIA Puts Harsh Tactics On Hold; Memo on Methods Of
Interrogation Had Wide Review, WASH. POST, July 27, 2004, at Al (reporting that use
of "enhanced interrogation techniques" by CIA were placed on hold because of legal
concerns).
119. See Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement of
Severe Interrogations, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 4,2007, at Al (reporting Justice Department
issues secret opinion in 2005 allowing for use of "painful psychological tactics" on
high-value detainees in CIA custody).
120. See Dick Marty, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Com-
mittee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of
Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States: Second Report, 'll 7, (June 11,
2007) available at http://assembly.coe.intlDocumentslWorkingDocslDoc07/edocl1302.
pdf ("There is now enough evidence to state that secret detention facilities run by the
CIA did exist in Europe from 2003 to 2005, in particular in Poland and Romania.").
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United States and the host nations. 121 The Polish site allegedly
hosted the highest value detainees, including Abu Zubaydeh
and Khalid Sheik Mohammed. 122 The report alleged that de-
tainees were forcibly exposed to extreme heat or cold; made to
listen to "torture music" composed of blaring rock or rap, dis-
torted verses from the Koran, industrial noises, and screams of
women and children; and held in contorted stress positions by
wall shackles. 123 If the CIA employed such interrogation tech-
niques on European soil, the host nations would be liable for
violating Article 3 of the Convention on Human Rights, accord-
ing to Ila~cu v. Moldova.
C. Application of Convention Obligations to the Extradition
of Terror Suspects to Nations Outside Europe
Besides the maintenance of CIA interrogation and deten-
tion facilities in European nations, there may be wider liability
for those member-states that participated in extradition of sus-
pects to non European countries. A leading Strasbourg case that
corresponds to this fact pattern is Soering v. United Kingdom. 124
Jens Soering was a German national and student at the Univer-
sity of Virginia who allegedly murdered his girlfriend's parents
in Virginia. l25 Soering and his girlfriend left the country and
were later arrested in England. 126 While in English custody,
Soering allegedly admitted killing his girlfriend's parents.127
Soon afterwards, the United States requested that both Soering
and his girlfriend be returned to Virginia under the terms of an
extradition treaty between the United States and United King-
domps As the United Kingdom had abolished the death pen-
alty, it requested that upon Soering's extradition to the United
121. See id. lJI<j[ 72-122 (discussing framework under which CIA operations in Po-
land and Romania developed).
122. Id. n 126-27 (noting that the Polish detention site held the "most sensitive"
suspects who underwent "enhanced interrogation techniques").
123. See id. <j[lJI 245-271 (outlining reconstructed version of cell conditions).
124. App. No. 14038/88, 11 Em. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989).
125. See id. n 11-12 (outlining background to Soering case).
126. See id. "They disappeared together from Virginia in October 1985, but were
arrested in England in April 1986 in connection with cheque fraud." Id.
127. See id. lJI 13 (outlining Soering's alleged confession to English police).
128. See id. lJI14 (noting request for extradition of Soering and his girlfriend back
to United States).
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States, the death sentence not be sought.129 However, the attor-
ney for Bedford County, Virginia, where the murders occurred,
indicated that he would seek the death penalty upon a finding of
Soering's guilt.130
Soering argued that extradition from the United Kingdom
to Virginia would result in "inhuman and degrading treatment"
prohibited under Article 3 because he would be subject to the
"death row phenomenon" if found guilty.l31 In essence, he ar-
gued that Article 3 of the Convention not only prohibits such
treatment within the jurisdiction of member-states, but also obli-
gates them to avoid placing a person in a position where he may
suffer such treatment in other nations.132 In contrast, the United
Kingdom argued that such a reading would create numerous dif-
ficulties for Convention members.B3 It asserted that member-
states should not be responsible for the actions of governments
in other nations, and argued that Soering's interpretation of Ar-
ticle 3 would disrupt international extradition treaties and create
unreasonable responsibilities on the extraditing nation to ex-
amine the conditions and laws of receiving nations.134
The Court began its analysis by noting that although a
member-state should not be responsible for all the conse-
quences of its actions abroad, the Convention requires that its
protections be practical, effective, and consistent with the values
of a democratic society.l35 A fundamental protection enshrined
in the Convention is the prohibition of inhuman treatment and
torture, an obligation that cannot be waived even in times of
emergency or war.136 Furthermore, knowingly extraditing an in-
dividual to a nation where there are "substantial grounds" for
believing that an individual would suffer treatment contrary to
Article 3 would not be consistent with the Convention's val-
129. See Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439, <jJ
20 (1989) (noting attorney for Bedford County, Virginia, recognized United King-
dom's desire for Virginia to avoid imposing death penalty on Soering upon finding of
guilt).
130. Id. ("[T]he Virginia authorities informed the United Kingdom Government
that Mr. Updike ... intended to seek the death penalty in Mr. Soering's case").
131. See id. <jJ 76.
132. Id. <jJ 82.
133. See id. <jJ 83.
134. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, <jJ 83.
135. Id. <jJ 87.
136. Id. <jJ 88.
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ues.l37 In Soering's case, the Court was forced to determine if,
upon extradition to the United States, Soering would run "a real
risk of being sentenced to death in Virginia, since the source of
the alleged inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment,
namely the 'death row phenomenon,' lies in the imposition of
the death penalty."138
Soering contended that a death row sentence amounted to
inhuman treatment under Article 3 because it typically involves
years of appeals, heightened psychological trauma, exposure to
extreme physical conditions on death row, the possibility of sex-
ual abuse at the hands of others, and the constant reminder of
the death penalty.139 In its holding, the Court agreed with
Soering:
[I]n the Court's view, having regard to the very long period of time
spent on death row in such extreme conditions, with the ever present
and mounting anguish of awaiting execution of the death penalty, and
to the personal circumstances of the applicant, especially his age and
mental state at the time of the offence, the applicant's extradition to
the United States would expose him to a real risk of treatment going
beyond the threshold set by Article 3.140
The Court concluded that the United Kingdom would be in vio-
lation of Article 3 if it proceeded to extradite Soering to
Virginia.141
Chahal v. The United Kingdom 142 is another key extradition
case that triggered analysis of potential Article 3 responsibil-
ity.143 Chahal was an Indian national who immigrated to En-
gland illegally, but was eventually allowed to stay under a
general amnesty.144 He became active in the Sikh autonomy
movement, and in a return trip to India, he was allegedly ar-
137. [d. (discussing application of general principles of Convention to extradition
of persons).
138. [d. 91 92.
139. Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439, 91 105
(1989) (outlining Soering's arguments that the "death row phenomenon" amounts to
an Article 3 violation).
140. /d. 91 111.
141. See id. Soering was later extradited to Virginia upon guarantees that the
death penalty would not be sought for the murders. He is currently serving prison
time in Virginia, has authored several books, published a website (http://
www.jenssoering.com/). and maintains his innocence.
142. App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413 (1996).
143. See id.
144. See id. 91 12 (outlining background and legal status of plaintiffs).
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rested and mistreated by government police.145 Upon his re-
lease and return to England, Chahal became deeply involved in
the Punjab independence movement. In the mid 1980s, Chahal
was charged with a variety of crimes, including alleged involve-
ment in conspiracies to kill the Indian Prime Minister and vari-
ous political rivals in England.146 In 1990, the United Kingdom's
Home Secretary determined that Chahal should be deported
from the country because of national security concerns.147 The
Home Secretary believed that Chahal was involved in the active
planning and support of terrorist activities both in India and En-
gland.148 Chahal made a claim for political asylum in the United
Kingdom, and argued that if he was sent back to India he would
be tortured for his political activities.149
The United Kingdom denied Chahal's asylum claim and the
government proceeded with its plans to deport him. He filed
suit with the Strasbourg Court, and argued that deportation
would amount to an Article 3 violation because he would be
persecuted and mistreated upon his return to India.150 The
United Kingdom's counter-argument rested on a sliding scale
analogy. It argued that the Court should weigh the risk that
Chahal posed as a national security threat against the risk that
he would receive ill treatment in India. 15I Because it was uncer-
tain he would be tortured or mistreated in India, the allegation
that he was a threat to national security should rule in favor of
his deportation:
The greater the risk of ill-treatment, the less weight should be ac-
corded to the threat to national security. But where there existed a
substantial doubt with regard to the risk of ill-treatment, the threat to
national security could weigh heavily in the balance to be struck be-
tween protecting the rights of the individual and the general interests
of the community.152
145. See id. H 17-18 (outlining Chahal's return trip to India).
146. See id. H 23-24 (outlining Chahal's arrests in United Kingdom).
147. See id. <JI<j[ 23-25 (describing Chahal's arrests and Homeland Secretary's in-
tention to deport him according to Immigration Act of 1971).
148. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413, <JI
30 (1996) (discussing Homeland Secretary's identification of Chahal as a major figure
involved in planning and funding Sikh terrorist activities).
149. See id. <JI 26 (outlining Chahal's arguments and allegations that he would be
tortured by Indian authorities).
150. See id. <JI 72.
151. Id.
152. See id. <JI 76
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In response, Chahal argued that the protections of Article 3 can-
not be mediated by concerns for national security.153
The Court agreed with Chahal's interpretation of Article 3
and ruled in his favor against the United Kingdom.154 In an im-
portant dictum, it also noted that Article 3's provisions are abso-
lute even in the context of terrorism or national security:
The Court is well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in
modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence.
However, even in these circumstances, the Convention prohibits in
absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, irrespective of the victim's conduct.
The prohibition provided by Article 3 (art. 3) against ill-treatment is
equally absolute in expulsion cases. Thus, whenever substantial
grounds have been shown for believing that an individual would face
a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (art.
3) if removed to another State, the responsibility of the Contracting
State to safeguard him or her against such treatment is engaged in the
event of expulsion. . . . In these circumstances, the activities of the
individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be
a material consideration.155
Therefore, the Court was charged with determining
whether or not Chahal's deportation would pose a real risk of
ill-treatment banned under Article 3. Chahal pointed to a num-
ber of factors, including the allegations that he had previously
been tortured by authorities in India, and reports by Amnesty
International that Punjabi police operated with impunity and
were known to kidnap and torture Sikh militants. 156 The Court
was particularly concerned with the fact that despite the history
of "disappearances" and human rights violations in the coun-
try's campaign against Sikh militants, there had been no funda-
mental changes or reforms to the Indian police forces that
would guarantee compliance with human rights. 157 For these
reasons, the Court found that "there is a real risk of Mr. Chahal
being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3) if he is
153. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep.
413, 9I 77 (1996).
154. [d. 9I 107.
155. [d. 9I9I 79-80.
156. See id. 9I9I 87-89 (reviewing governmental, intergovernmental, and nongov-
ernmental assessments of the human rights situation in India).
157. [d. 9I9I 102-103 (considering human rights violations by Indian police against
Sikh militants and lack of police reform).
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returned to India. Accordingly, the order for his deportation to
India would, if executed, give rise to a violation of Article 3."158
Since the Chahal decision, the European Court of Human
Rights has continued to uphold and clarify the general principles
regarding Article 3 and expulsion elucidated in Soering and
Chahal. 159 In Ahmed v. Austria,160 the plaintiff Ahmed had been
granted refugee status in Austria as a member of a Somali dissi-
dent movement under Article 1 of the United Nations Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees.161 Later the authorities
arrested Ahmed in Austria for an attempted violent robbery.162
Under the United Nations Convention, an individual forfeits his
refugee status upon commission of a serious crime.I63 Thus, Ah-
med faced revocation of his refugee status and deportation to
Somalia. In a ruling similar to that in Chahal, the Court held
that "the activities of the individual in question, however unde-
sirable or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration" in Ar-
ticle 3 expulsion cases.I64 The Court concluded that because
Ahmed would be at a real risk for mistreatment if returned to
158. Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, <jJ
107 (1996).
159. Earlier cases on Article 3 and expulsion precede the 1996 Soering case, al-
though Chahal was the first major case in which the plaintiff won on grounds that an
expulsion would lead to violations of Article 3. See Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom,
App. Nos. 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87, 13448/87, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 248, <jJ
108 (1991) (Tamils expulsed from England not at personal risk for ill-treatment upon
return to Sri Lanka); Cruz Varas v. Sweden, App. No. 15576/89, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, <jJ
82 (1991) (Chilean national expulsed from Sweden not at real risk for ill-treatment
upon return to Chile).
160. App. No. 25964/94, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 278 (1996).
161. See id. <jJ 11 (explaining how the Minister of Interior granted refugee status
within meaning of Geneva Convention). See generally Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, art. 1, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
162. See Ahmed, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. <jJ 12 (1996). "[T]ogether with an accomplice,
Mr. Ahmed had struck a passer-by in the face and attempted to steal his wallet." Id.
163. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, <jJ 2, July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by
a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a dan-
ger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, consti-
tutes a danger to the community of that country.
[d.
164. Ahmed v. Austria, App. No. 25964/94, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. <jJ 41 (1996).
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Somalia, Austria would be in violation of Article 3 if it pro-
ceeded with the expulsion.165
In D. v. The United Kingdom, the Court faced an Article 3
expulsion case with a significantly different factual context.166
Authorities arrested D., a national of St. Kitts and Nevis, at
London's Gatwick Airport while attempting to smuggle a large
amount of cocaine.167 When serving his prison sentence in the
United Kingdom, it was discovered that D. was suffering from
symptoms associated with the end stages of AIDS.168 D. was to
be returned back to St. Kitts and Nevis upon completion of his
prison sentence, but petitioned the European Court to stay in
England.169 He argued that deportation to St. Kitts and Nevis
would amount to a violation of the prohibition of inhuman
treatment under Article 3 because his disease would progress
without the sufficient treatment he could receive in England:
[H]is removal to St [sic] Kitts would condemn him to spend his re-
maining days in pain and suffering in conditions of isolation, squalor
and destitution.... His already weakened immune system would not
be able to resist the many opportunistic infections to which he would
be exposed on account of his homelessness, lack of proper diet and
the poor sanitation on the island.170
The United Kingdom argued that, unlike the factual con-
text in Soering, Chahal, or Ahmed, D. would not be at risk from
receiving ill-treatment or persecution through the active efforts
of government authorities or other entities, but would instead
suffer from the terminal stages of a natural disease. l7l Noting
that removing D. to St. Kitts and Nevis would certainly "hasten
his death" and "subject him to acute mental and physical suffer-
ing,"l72 the Court sided with D. and found that in these excep-
165. See id. en 47. "It follows that the applicant's deportation to Somalia would
breach Article 3 of the Convention for as long as he faces a serious risk of being
subjected there to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment." [d.
166. App. No. 30240/96, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 423 (1997).
167. See id. en 7 (outlining facts surrounding D.'s arrest and imprisonment).
168. See id. en 8 (noting D.'s diagnosis of AIDS after suffering symptoms of
pneumocystis carini pneumonia).
169. Id. cncn 10-11.
170. [d. en 40.
171. See D. 24 Eur. Ct. H.R., en 42. "His hardship and reduced life expectancy
would stem from his terminal and incurable illness coupled with the deficiencies in the
health and social-welfare system of a poor, developing country." Id.
172. [d. en 52.
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tional factual circumstances, a deportation by the United
Kingdom would amount to a violation of Article 3.J73
The Soering and Chahal line of cases indicate that member-
states to the Convention violate Article 3 by extraditing or ex-
pulsing persons from their nations to non-member nations
where they face a real risk of suffering from inhuman treatment.
Given this precedent, it is difficult to imagine how European
member-states to the Convention cannot be in violation of Arti-
cle 3 by participating in a CIA program specifically designed to
render persons to other nations for interrogation and torture.
Chahal indicates that in such cases no consideration can be
given to the person's activities or behavior, even in the context
of national security and terrorism concernsY4 Article 3's pro-
tections are absolute rights and cannot be diluted by other
considerations.
III. CONCLUSION
Precedent from the European Court of Human Rights
demonstrates that European nations which participated in the
CIA rendition program are liable for violations of Article 3 of
the Convention on Human Rights. This would include countries
which allowed detention facilities to exist on European soil, as
well as those which cooperated in the rendering of captives to
destinations outside Europe to be mistreated or tortured. It is
likely that in some cases the court systems of individual nations
may address and resolve charges of extraordinary rendition as a
domestic criminal legal procedureYs In other cases, European
Court of Human Rights precedent may have more direct impli-
cations as a domestic matter. For example, the United Kingdom
has adopted almost wholesale the European Convention on
Human Rights as its nationallaw,176 and its courts have heard
173. See id. 'lI 53. "In view of these exceptional circumstances and bearing in
mind the critical stage now reached in the applicant's fatal illness, the implementation
of the decision to remove him to St [sic] Kitts would amount to inhuman treatment by
the respondent State in violation of Article 3." Id.
174. Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. Ct. Rep. 413, 'lI 80
(1996).
175. See Italy Considers CIA Kidnap Trial, BBC, (Jan. 9, 2007), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/6243991.stm (discussing Italian court hearings to indict
CIA and Italian agents for kidnapping Egyptian cleric in Italy who was later tortured
in Egypt).
176. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.).
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and decided cases of foreign implication using European Court
of Human Rights precedent.177 Finally, the European Court it-
self would likely serve as the final arbiter of any case alleging
rendition that survives domestic procedure.
177. See R. v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2004] EWHC 2911 (OB) [81]-[89] (U.K.)
(discussing case of Iraqi man tortured to death during British custody in Iraq).
